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A MINIMALIST APPROACH TO SAME-SEX DIVORCE:
RESPECTING STATES THAT PERMIT SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
AND STATES THAT REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THEM
Robert E. Rains*
"Thus Grief still treads upon the Heels of Pleasure: Married in haste,
we may repent at leisure. "

-William

Congreve, The Old Batchelour, Act V, Scene 1 (1693)
I. INTRODUCTION

Unlike most modem countries, the United States has no general law of
domestic relations. The powers delegated in the Constitution to the Congress do
not include the governance of family law.' Moreover, the Bill of Rights provides
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." 2 Thus, in 1890, the US Supreme Court unequivocally stated, "[t]he whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In the ensuing 120
years, Congress has, directly and indirectly, addressed multiple family law issues
utilizing its various delegated powers.4 But it remains true that there is no federal
law of marriage or divorce. Each of the fifty states has its own marriage and
divorce laws, and they are often in sharp conflict with each other.' For example,
until the Supreme Court ruled such laws unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia6 in
1967, sixteen states still prohibited interracial couples from getting married, while
thirty-four states authorized such unions.
* 2012
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'See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
CONST. amend. X.
Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).

2 U.S.

See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 15-16.
There have been efforts over the years to create uniform marriage and divorce laws
on the state level, but they have met with little success. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued a proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act in 1970, but, to date, only eight states have adopted some form of that act. See UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159 (1998).
6 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
Loving, 388 U.S. at 6. Had Barack Obama's parents attempted to get married in
4

5

1961 in Virginia, or to have even lived in Virginia as a married couple, they would have

been subject to criminal prosecution as were the Lovings.
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While the once heated debate over interracial marriage is today probably
viewed in most circles as an embarrassing vestige of the era of "Jim Crow," basic
disagreements continue among the states as to who can marry whom. American
states are fairly equally divided as to whether first cousins may marry.8
But, of course, the current marriage issue that most animates vitriolic political
dispute in the United States and elsewhere is the question of same-sex couples.
This issue first came to the fore in the United States with the 1993 decision of the
Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin,9 in which that court ruled that several
same-sex couples had stated a cause of action that Hawaii's prohibition on samesex marriage arguably violated the Hawaii State Constitution.'o This decision,
which only called for a remand of the case, created a public firestorm. At the
federal level, Congress enacted the "Defense of Marriage Act" ("DOMA"). "
The federal DOMA has but two substantive provisions. One provision is that
the United States government will not recognize a same-sex marriage for any
federal purpose.' 2 The other provision addresses interstate concerns, specifically
recognition by one state of a same-sex marriage legally performed in another state:
8 See Frederick Kunkle, Pa. Cousins Try to Overcome Taboo of ' Do,' WASH. POST,
Apr. 25, 2005, at BI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/04/24/AR2005042401406.html (reporting on Pennsylvania first cousins who
traveled to Maryland to avoid Pennsylvania's prohibition on first cousins' marriage, and
noting the cloyingly named Cousins United to Defeat Discriminating Laws Through
Education (C.U.D.D.L.E.)); cf Marriage Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 76, sch. 1 (U.K.)
(allowing the marriage of first cousins).
9 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
'0 Id. at 52-54. Baehr was a sharp departure from prior state court decisions on the
subject, all of which had rejected the concept of a right to same-sex marriage. See Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (asserting "marriage has always been considered as
the union of a man and a woman"); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971)
(holding Minnesota law "does not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex and
that such marriages are . . . prohibited" and dismissing the appeal for "want of a substantial
federal question"), 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) ("The law makes no provision for 'marriage' between persons of the
same sex."); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding, "as a
matter of law," two persons of the same sex cannot contract a common law marriage).
" Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 1 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
12 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). This provision has been and continues to be challenged. Most
notably, on July 8, 2010, federal district Judge Joseph L. Tauro issued two companion
decisions striking down this section. In Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, he ruled that this section violated both the Tenth Amendment and the
Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249, 253 (D. Mass. 2010).
In Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, he further ruled that it violated "the equal
protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment." 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D.
Mass. 2010). The United States appealed both decisions to the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, but the status of those appeals became murky when Attorney General Eric Holder
announced on Feb. 23, 2011, that President Obama has concluded that this provision is
unconstitutional and, "[g]iven that conclusion, the President has instructed the Department
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No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a
right or claim arising from such relationship.' 3
This provision carves out an exception to the general American rule that a
marriage validly entered into in one state will be recognized in all other states.' 4
There is a constitutional, as well as a common law, basis for this rule, as the Full
Faith and Credit Clause provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."' 5
However, in enacting DOMA, Congress purported to rely on its enforcement
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: "And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."' 6 Whether this second provision of DOMA is a
proper exercise of that enforcement power, or a violation of it, is a hotly debated
question.
This Article will address the legal conundrum that arises when a person who
validly entered a same-sex marriage in one state seeks a divorce in another state
that refuses to recognize same-sex marriage. The Article will first discuss the
interstate recognition of marriages and divorces in general, then the patchwork
quilt of same-sex marriage laws in the United States, followed by a discussion on
seeking a legal exit from a same-sex marriage in a state that does not recognize
that marriage, and finally, suggest a path which will allow a court in the latter state

not to defend the statute in such cases. I fully concur with the President's determination."
See Statement of the Attorney Generalon Litigation Involving the Defense ofMarriageAct,
U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://wwwjustice/gov/opa/pr/201 1/February/i l-ag222.html. A group of Republican leaders of the House of Representatives-the Bipartisan

Legal Advisory Group-retained counsel and intervened to defend this section of DOMA.
On May 31, 2012, a panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
district court in a consolidated opinion. Comm'n of Massachusetts v. U. S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., No. 10-2204, 2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
14 See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 261 (2006).

15
U.S. CONST. art. IV,
6

id.

§ 1.

Compare Lynn D. Wardle, Non-recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments
under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 365 (2005) (arguing Congress
17

was acting within its authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause when it enacted
DOMA), with Hay, supra note 14, at 261 (arguing a "fine distinction" may be the key to

DOMA's constitutionality). A federal district court upheld this provision of DOMA against
multiple constitutional challenges in Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04, 1309
(M.D. Fla. 2005).
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to grant relief without violating the letter or spirit of state provisions barring
recognition of same-sex marriage.
II. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGES (AND DIVORCES) INGENERAL
The validity of a marriage entered into in another state is a matter that is
litigated with some frequency, but not usually on a constitutional basis. Different
courts have developed different frameworks for addressing this issue.
Perhaps the best-known case is the 1953 decision of the New York State
Court of Appeals in In re May's Estate.'8 In that case, a Jewish uncle and niece
were barred from marrying in New York.19 They traveled to Rhode Island, which
generally prohibited such marriages but allowed them for persons of the Jewish
faith. 20 The marriage lasted thirty-two years until the wife's death, and produced
six children.2' An estate battle ensued between the widower and three of the
children who claimed that their parents' marriage was invalid under New York
law, and therefore they were next of kin to their deceased mother.22 The surrogate
court (that is, the trial court) agreed with the three children that their parents'
marriage was void because it was "opposed to natural law" and contrary to New
York statutory law.23
The New York Court of Appeals, that state's highest court, disagreed. 2 4 It
expressed the "settled law" that the legality of a marriage is to be determined by
the law of the place where it is celebrated (lex loci celebrans).25 The only
exceptions are: (1) cases within the prohibition of positive law; and (2) "cases
involving polygamy or incest in a degree regarded generally as within the
prohibition of natural law." 26 The court found that New York's statute did not
contain a positive prohibition on recognition of an out-of-state uncle-niece
marriage. 2 7 And since the marriage was performed in accordance with "the ritual of
the Jewish faith," it was "not offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree
regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was not within the inhibitions of
natural law." 28
The May's Estate decision presents a number of interesting aspects. First, the
court never addressed the constitutionality of allowing a marriage of persons of
one faith where the same marriage would be declared void if the parties were of
another faith. Could a couple convert from one religion to another to avoid a
18114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).

21

id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
id.

22

id.

23

id.

24

Id. at 7.

'9 See
20

25
26

27

28

Id. at 6.
d.

d. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
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marriage prohibition? If a couple such as the Mays lawfully married in one religion
but later converted to another religion, would it affect their civil marriage? What if
they were an interfaith couple? Could they choose which religion governed the
validity of their marriage?
The second aspect of the May's Estate decision worth noting is the
subjectivity involved in a civil court's attempt to find and apply "natural law." This
was highlighted by the fact that a dissenting judge would have found that "[a]ll
such misalliances are incestuous, and all, equally, are void." 29 A court's reliance on
such an amorphous concept as natural law is akin to reliance on scripture, as often
happens today in the battle over same-sex relationships. 3 0 Those resorting to such
scriptural reliance would do well to recall that in 1959 the trial judge who
sentenced the Lovings for their crime of inter-racial marriage found support from
the Deity in doing so:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his [sic] arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The
fact that he [sic] separated the races shows that he [sic] did not intend for
the races to mix.3 '
It appears that none of the nine justices of the US Supreme Court who reversed the
Lovings' convictions shared the trial judge's views of a mandate from the Lord nor
did they fear divine retribution. 32
The third interesting lesson from May's Estate is that context is often critical
in marriage recognition cases. The Mays' marriage was of long duration, lasting
over three decades, and happy enough to produce six children. 3 3 There is no
indication that the couple ever separated, or that they doubted the validity of their
union.34 Their marriage was not attacked by either of them, but rather by three of
their children who were apparently motivated by greed over their mother's estate. 35
29

Id. at 9 (Desmond, J., dissenting).

See, e.g., Steven W. Fitschen, MarriageMatters: A Casefor a Get-the-Job-DoneRight Federal Marriage Amendment, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 1301, 1302, 1307-08 (2007)
30

(quoting Bible passages supporting the author's position that "God ordained heterosexual
marriage from the beginning of human history"); see also Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage
Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41
B.C. L. Rev. 265, 315 nn.323-27 (2000) (discussing the debate on whether heterosexual

marriage is ordained by God).
'3'Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
32 Id. at 12 (holding that marriage restrictions based on race violate Equal Protection
and Due Process); see also id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("It is simply not possible for
a state law to be valid . .. which makes the criminality of an act dependent upon the race of
the actor.").
3 In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 5.
34 See id.
"s See id.
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Might the result have been different if, shortly after their wedding in Rhode Island
and return to New York, the bride had "come to her senses," left her
uncle/husband, and sued for an annulment? There is, of course, no way of
knowing, but it seems far more likely that the New York courts would have
declared the marriage void under those circumstances.
Often, courts invoke the notion of "comity" to validate an out of state
marriage. Thus, in Hesington v. Estate of Hesington,

the Missouri Court of

Appeals opined: "However, as a matter of comity, Missouri will recognize a
marriage valid where contracted unless to do so would violate the public policy of
this state." 3 7 Note, however, that comity (giving deference to a foreign judgment,
decree, etc.) is a lesser mandate than the constitutional mandate of full faith and
credit-which itself is not absolute. 8 In Hesington, a Missouri woman wished to
establish that she was the widow of a deceased Missouri man by virtue of a
common law marriage they had entered into in Oklahoma in 1978.39 At the time of
the common law marriage ceremony, Oklahoma permitted common law marriages,
but Missouri had abolished such marriages in 1921. 40 The Missouri trial judge
found that had the couple been Oklahoma residents, they would have met
Oklahoma's requirements for a common law marriage. 4 1 Nevertheless, the trial
judge ruled that the couple's Oklahoma marriage was invalid in Missouri, and the
appellate court affirmed.42 The appellate court noted with approval the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971): "The validity of a marriage will be
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue,
has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage ....
Nevertheless, applying the principle of comity, the court indicated that
"Missouri will recognize a marriage valid where contracted unless to do so would
violate the public policy" of Missouri.4 The court noted that while other states are
split on the subject, the majority view is that a state that does not permit common
law marriages will not recognize a common law marriage of its residents when the

36

640 S.W.2d 824, 826-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 826.

Compare id. ("[A]s a matter of comity, Missouri will recognize a marriage valid
where contracted unless to do so would violate the public policy of this state."), with
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296 (1942) ("[E]ven though [a] cause of action
could not be entertained in the state of the forum, either because it had been barred by the
local statute of limitations or contravened local policy, the judgment thereon obtained in a
38

sister state is entitled to full faith and credit . . . [and although s]ome exceptions have been

grafted on the rule ... [they] have been few and far between .....
39 Hesington, 640 S.W.2d at 824.
40
1d. at 825.
41 Id. at 824-25.
42
Id. at 824-25, 827.
43 Id. at 826.
44Id.
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common law marriage took place during a temporary sojourn to a state that permits
such marriages.45
The court found that when the Missouri legislature abolished common law
marriage, it had as a purpose "to require some degree of solemnity and reliability
in establishing a marriage of those domiciled in and residing in Missouri.A6
Recognizing the Oklahoma common law marriage of the Missouri residents in this
case would violate that public policy. 4 7
On a strictly logical basis, it is hard to square the result in Hesington with the
result in May 's Estate. Both involved marriages that were lawful where contracted.
But the couple in May 's Estate could not under any circumstances have married in
their state of residence because of their consanguinity. There is no suggestion in
Hesington that there was any bar whatsoever to the Hesingtons' marriage in their
home state; they simply entered into their marriage in a less formal fashion than
their home state allowed. In other words, their error only went to the "formalities"
of marriage, not the essentials. Therefore, from a logical standpoint, Mr.
Hesington's widow had a stronger claim than Mrs. May's widower.
Other than different courts addressing different cases at different times, the
only reasonable explanation for the contradictory results is, again, context. The
Mays were married for thirty-two years and produced six children. A ruling that
their marriage was void would have almost certainly rendered those children
"illegitimate" at a time when illegitimacy not only carried a great social stigma, but
also far greater legal disadvantages than it does today.48 (It is indeed ironic that
three of the Mays' children were effectively arguing in court for their own
illegitimacy.)
By contrast, the Hesingtons entered into their purported common law
marriage less than two years before Mr. Hesington's death. 49 There is no indication
that their union was blessed with issue, hence there were apparently no children
who would be deemed illegitimate by virtue of the Missouri court's ruling.
A case applying yet another approach to marriage recognition is the 1984
Washington Court of Appeals decision, In re Estate of Shippy.so This case actually
involved the laws of three states: Washington, California, and Alaska.5 1 James
Shippy executed a will in January 1972, leaving his estate to his then wife,
45 Id. (collecting cases).
46

See id. at 827.

47 Id. (noting that the statute provided the "highest evidence" of the state's public
policy regarding common law marriage).
48 Lili Mostofi, Legitimizing the Bastard: The Supreme Court's Treatment of the
Illegitimate Child, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 453 (2004) (describing the extension of
rights to illegitimate children over the course of approximately forty years). But see
Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REv. 345 (2011) (arguing that social stigma and

discrimination against illegitimate issue continue).
49
Hesington, 640 S.W.2d at 824.
50
51

678 P.2d 848 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
See id. at 849.
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Marion. 52 In January 1973, Marion obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce
from James in California.5 3 James married Inge in Alaska in 1978 although his
divorce from Marion was not final.54 James died in a plane crash in Alaska on July
15, 1981.55 On November 16, 1981, four months after James' death, the California
court entered the final decree nunc pro tunc divorcing James and Marion as of May
14, 1973.6 In the subsequent estate battle in Washington, the trial court found that
Inge was not James' surviving spouse because her marriage to James was void
under Alaska law.57 The nice issue presented was which state's law would control
regarding the retroactive effect of a nunc pro tunc decree on an intervening second
marriage.5 8 Under the majority view, including the law of Washington state, the
later nunc pro tunc decree would validate the intervening marriage. 5 9 Some states
took the contrary position.60 Although Alaska courts had not addressed the issue,

Alaska statutory law provided that, "[a] subsequent marriage contracted by a
person during the life of a former husband or wife which marriage has not been
annulled or dissolved is void." 61 Hence the Washington Court of Appeals
concluded that if it applied Alaska law, James and Inge's marriage would appear to
be void. This would have defeated Inge's claim because the counterpart of the
general rule that a marriage validly entered into is valid everywhere is that a
marriage invalidly entered into is invalid everywhere.63
The court went on, however, to apply a choice of law approach that appears to
be the polar opposite of those used in May's Estate and Hesington. Relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283 comment i (1971), it reasoned
that the Alaska marriage would not be deemed invalid in Washington unless:
[t]he intensity of the interest of the state where the marriage was
contracted in having its invalidating rule applied outweighs the policy of
protecting the expectations of the parties by upholding the marriage and

Id.

52

Id.
See id.
5 Id.
56 Id. The opinion does not explain the eight-year delay from the interlocutory decree
to the final decree nor indicate who, if anyone, asked the California court to issue the final
5

54

decree.
SId.
5

at 849-50.
850.

1Id. at

59Id.

Id. (collecting cases).
Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.-080 (1982)).
62 Id.- The court noted that Alaska did not
have a provision for common law marriage,
and that under Alaska statutory law, a "[m]arriage is prohibited and void if performed
when (1) either party to the proposed marriage has a husband or wife living." Id. (citing
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.021).
63 See Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) ("A marriage that is
void where it was celebrated is void everywhere.").
6
61
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the interest of the other state with the validating rule in having this rule
applied. 4
Although the court was unable to determine James and Inge's state of
residence at the time of their Alaska marriage, it found that Washington had a
substantial relationship to the parties because they resided in Washington when
James died, property existed in Washington to be distributed, and probate
proceedings were pending in Washington. Thus, Washington law would apply
unless Alaska had a clearly contrary policy. 6 6 Alaska law, by itself, did not
establish such a policy. 6 7 Indeed Washington had a similar statute, but its courts
would still recognize such a marriage. 6 8 Thus, "to protect the expectations of James
and Inge," the court applied Washington law and validated their Alaska marriage. 69
The Shippy decision raises as many issues as it answers. The Shippys'
marriage was longer (five years) 70 than the Hesingtons' (two years), but
considerably shorter than the Mays' (thirty-two years). While the court explicitly
concerned itself with James and Inge's expectations, it did so at the expense of
James' children (who may or may not have been the product of his marriage to
Marion). 7 1 The most reasonable explanation is that James and Inge were unaware
that his divorce from Marion had not been finalized. Although ignorance of the law
is generally no excuse, the court simply chose to protect Inge if she was unfamiliar
with the difference between a California interlocutory divorce decree and final
divorce decree. Indeed, it is probable that James 'told her-and actually believedthat he was divorced from Marion. It appears that it was his intention to divorce
Marion and, later, to marry Inge. Viewed this way, his error might, or might not,
be deemed to have gone to the formalities-as opposed to the essentials---of
marriage.
Some state legislatures have sought to proactively bar their residents who
cannot marry in their state of residency from getting married in another
jurisdiction. For example, Wisconsin enacted a law in 1971 to prevent Wisconsin
"deadbeat dads" from marrying.72 The law generally barred parents who were in

6 Shippy, 678 P.2d at 851 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
283 cmt. i (1971)).
65 id
66 id
67 Id.
68 Id. at 851-52 (citing In re Estate of Storer, 544 P.2d 95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975)).
69
Id. at 852.
7
o ld. at 849.
' See id. at 849, 852. James had two children, Dorothy Coe and Thomas Shippy. It is
unclear whether they were the product of James' marriage to Marion.
72 Wis. STAT. §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973). The United States Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the law seven years after its passage. Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978).
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arrears in paying child support from marrying. 73 It specifically addressed out-ofstate marriages:
This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state;
and s. 245.04(1) and (2) [providing that out-of-state marriages to
circumvent Wisconsin law are void] are applicable hereto. Any
marriage contracted without compliance with this section, where such
compliance is required, shall be void, whether entered into in this
state or elsewhere. 74
The United States Supreme Court struck down the law in its entirety, finding
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and hence had no
occasion to address the constitutionality of its extraterritorial provision.
Attacking this issue from the opposite perspective, in 1912 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed the confusingly
named "Uniform Marriage Evasion Act."76 Under that statute, a state would not
permit a marriage to take place within its borders if it was between nonresidents
who were forbidden to marry in their home state. (Hence the statute should have
been called the Uniform Marriage Prohibition Evasion Act. It was intended to
prevent certain people from evading marriage prohibitions in their home states,
rather than evading marriage.) Most states already had some form of marriage
evasion act. The proposed uniform act was only adopted in five states, and the
Uniform Law Commissioners withdrew it in 1943.78 However, withdrawal by the
commissioners of a uniform law does not repeal that law in any state that has
already adopted it.7 9 Only a state's legislature can repeal a law (or that state's
courts may strike it down). Indeed, over six decades after the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act was withdrawn, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied
Massachusetts' version of that act to bar same-sex couples from Connecticut,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont from getting married in Massachusetts. 80

73 See WIS. STAT.
74

§§ 245.10(1-{3).

Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375 n.1 (alterations in original) (quoting Wis. STAT. §

245.10(5)).
7
1Id. at 377.
76

See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 632 n.3 (Mass. 2006)

(Spina, J., concurring).
7 Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1943 HANDBOOK NAT'L COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM ST. L. & PROC. FIFTY-THIRD ANN. CONF. 64.
78

See id.

7 See
80

Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d 632 (Spina, J., concurring).
Id. at 631. On remand, the Superior Court of Massachusetts, at Suffolk, also applied
Massachusetts' Marriage Evasion Act to bar same-sex couples from New York from being
married in Massachusetts. Cote-Whiteacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL
3208758, at *4-5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29. 2006).
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The US Supreme Court has had limited opportunity to address interstate
marriage recognition. In 1888, in Maynard v. Hill,8' the Court upheld a ruling of
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington that a decedent was married to
his second wife at the time of his death. 82 David Maynard had married Lydia
Maynard in Vermont in 1828 and had two children by her.83 In 1852, allegedly
with no notice to Lydia, David obtained a legislative divorce from her.8 4 Shortly
thereafter, David married Catherine, with whom he lived until his death." In the
ensuing estate battle, Lydia's children asserted that Lydia was still legally married
to David when he made a "donation claim" to certain land after the legislative
divorce.86 Lydia's children raised various due process objections to the legislative
divorce, all of which were ultimately rejected.8 7 The Court did not directly address
any interstate conflict of laws issues in Maynard.
In 1907, in Travers v. Reinhardt,88 the US Supreme Court reviewed a decision
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia addressing the marriage of a
man from Washington, D.C. to a woman from West Virginia. 89 The marriage took
place in Virginia, but was defective there because of the lack of a proper minister;
however, it was arguably ratified as a common law marriage in New Jersey during
short stays there. 90 The US Supreme Court affirmed the District of Columbia
court's finding that the parties had been validly common law married in New
Jersey. 9 1 As in Maynard, the Court did not directly address the standards for
interstate marriage recognition.
In Williams v. North Carolina,92 a case that went to the US Supreme Court
twice, the Court did address, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, North
Carolina's refusal to recognize the marriage of two North Carolinians in Nevada. 9 3
However, the validity of their marriage hinged on the recognition of the parties'
divorce decrees, which were issued by the State of Nevada and purported to
dissolve the parties' prior marriages to their respective spouses who remained in
North Carolina. 9 4

' 125 U.S. 190 (1888).

82

See id.at 193, 215-16.

8

Id. at 191-92.

84

Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193.

86

Id at 193-95.
* Id at 193, 196, 216.
205 U.S. 423 (1907).
9Id. at 432-33.
90 Id at 433-34, 438-39. The parties also had lived in Maryland during the marriage.
8

Id. at 438.
9

' Id. at 442.

317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams 1); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945) (Williams 11).
93 Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 289-92; Williams 1I, 325 U.S. at 234, 236.
94 Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 289-92; Williams II, 325 U.S. at 235-39.
92
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Briefly, O.B. Williams married Carrie Wyke in 1916 in North Carolina and
lived with her there until 1940.95 Lillie Shaver Hendrix married Thomas Hendrix in
1920 in North Carolina and lived with him there until 1940.96 In May 1940, O.B.
and Lillie travelled to Las Vegas, Nevada ("Sin City," then as now), where each
filed for divorce in June 1940.97 Neither of their spouses was personally served in
Nevada, although each apparently received notice of the proceedings." Neither
entered an appearance or participated in any way in either divorce action. 99 The
Nevada court granted O.B. a divorce on August 26, 1940, and Lillie a divorce on
October 4, 1940.100 Not letting the grass grow under their feet, O.B. and Lillie got
married that same day in Nevada.' 0 ' Presumably, if they had remained in Nevada,
they could have lived there together legally ever after.
But O.B. and Lillie returned to North Carolina, where they were tried,
convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment for the crime of bigamous
cohabitation. 0 2 The North Carolina courts ruled that North Carolina was not
required to recognize their Nevada divorce decrees under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. o3

The first time that the Williams case went to the US Supreme Court, in 1942,
the Court presumed that the newlyweds had met Nevada's domiciliary
requirements for a divorce.10 4 Overturning past precedent, the Court ruled that a
state is empowered to enter a divorce decree that is entitled to full faith and credit
in all other states, as long as one of the spouses is domiciled in that state and
provides "substituted service" on the other party that meets the requirements of due
process. 05 In other words, a state court-applying its own state divorce laws-can
grant a divorce that is binding on both parties even when the marriage was entered
into in another state, their entire married life took place in another state, and the
defendant spouse has never set foot in the state issuing the divorce, was not served
in that state and did not participate in the divorce action-as long as the defendant
spouse has received "substituted service." Finally, in Williams I, the Court
06
remanded the case to the courts of North Carolina for further proceedings.1
O.B. and Lillie were retried before a jury of their peers in North Carolina.' 0 7
The trial judge instructed the jury that O.B. and Lillie had the burden to
9 Herbert R. Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce!: Williams v. North Carolina, 24
N.C. L. REv. 1, 2 (1949).

Id.
Id.
98 Williams 1, 317 U.S.
at 289-90.
99 Id.
00
1 Id. at 290.
96

9

'01

Id

'o2 Id. at 289-90.
03

1

Id. at 291.

'" Id. at 292-93, 302.

Id. at 299, 302-04.
Id. at 304.
107 Williams II, 325 U.S. at 233-36.
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demonstrate that they were domiciled in Nevada at the time they obtained their
divorces, and that the Nevada court's recitation of bona fide domicil in their
divorce decrees was "prima facie evidence," but did not compel "such an
inference."',0 8 If they had only gone to Nevada to get their divorces, intending to
return to North Carolina on obtaining them, then they neither lost their North
Carolina domicil nor acquiesced new domicils in Nevada.10 9 The jury duly
convicted O.B. and Lillie again of bigamous cohabitation, and that conviction was
upheld through the North Carolina courts."o
On appeal to the US Supreme Court the second time, the critical issue was
whether the North Carolina courts had failed to give full faith and credit to the
Nevada divorce decrees, specifically insofar as those decrees found that O.B. and
Lillie had bona fide domicil in Nevada."' In Williams II, the Court ruled that,
although the "fact that the Nevada court found that they were domiciled there is
entitled to respect, and more," the North Carolina courts were not bound by that
finding.11 2 North Carolina was free to reexamine this issue and had done so, giving
appropriate weight to the Nevada court's findings." 3 Concluding that North
Carolina had not violated the full faith and credit clause, the Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions for bigamous cohabitation.14
The Williams I and Williams II decisions-made during the era of "migratory
divorce," when the unhappily married frequently left their spouse and home state
to find a more conducive jurisdiction and congenial life partner-remain the law in
the United States today. The result of those decisions for the individual litigants
(O.B. and Lillie) was a truly anomalous situation. As far as Nevada was concerned,
they were divorced from their original spouses and lawfully married to each other.
As far as North Carolina was concerned, they were each married to their original
spouses and it was criminal for them to hold themselves out as married to each
other. The Supreme Court rather blithely acknowledged that if one state can review
the validity of a divorce, and hence a remarriage, in another state, then "persons
may, no doubt, place themselves in situations that create unhappy consequences
for them.""' And that is precisely the situation faced today by certain people who
have entered into a same-sex marriage in one state that they have tried to lawfully
exit in another state.
Two more Supreme Court full faith and credit cases in the domestic relations
arena warrant brief discussion. The Court refined the Williams I doctrine in two
subsequent decisions, both of which, not coincidentally, involved departing
spouses who sought their legal freedom in Nevada.
1o' Id. at 235-36 N.B. in describing Williams, this Article uses the Court's spelling of
"domicil" in the case. Modem usage is "domicile."
109 Id
Id. at 227.

"o

"' Id.

12
113
4

Id. at 233-34.
id

Id. at 239.
s Id at 237.
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In the 1948 case Estin v. Estin,116 the Court addressed the situation of Mr.
Estin, who was married in New York in 1937 and lived there with his wife until
they separated in 1942."' In 1943, his wife filed an action against him in New
York for a legal separation, which the court granted, along with $180 per month as
legal alimony that, under New York law as it then existed, would continue until the
parties were divorced." 8 Mr. Estin, like other unhappy spouses before and since,
headed out to Nevada in 1944 and brought a divorce action in 1945 (thereby
clearly meeting the domiciliary requirement)." 9 His wife was notified of the action
(thereby meeting the due process requirement), but entered no appearance and did
not participate.120 Mr. Estin duly informed the Nevada court of the New York
separation and alimony decree; nevertheless, the Nevada court entered a divorce
decree with no provision for alimony.121 So, of course, Mr. Estin stopped paying
his now ex-wife.122 She, naturally, sued him in New York to compel continued
payments.123 He appeared in that action and moved to eliminate the New York
alimony order on the basis of his Nevada divorce decree, but the New York courts
ruled that the Nevada decree did not extinguish his ex-wife's right to alimony
under the earlier New York decree.124
On appeal, the Supreme Court created the doctrine of "divisible" divorce,
ruling that the Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit to the extent that
it changed the marital status of the parties, but not insofar as it purported to change
the "legal incidence of the marriage," in other words, the alimony order.125
Because the alimony order was a property interest of the wife, Nevada could not
affect that interest without personal jurisdiction over her, which it lacked. 2 6
A decade later, the Court refined the Estin divisible divorce doctrine in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.127 The Vanderbilts were married in 1948 and lived in
California, where they separated in 1952. She moved to New York, and he went to
Nevada where he obtained a divorce decree in 1953, freeing both parties "from the
bonds of matrimony and all the duties and obligations thereof." 28 Mrs. Vanderbilt
received notice of the Nevada action but was not served in Nevada and did not
participate. 129 In 1954, the former Mrs. Vanderbilt filed suit in New York for a

116

334 U.S. 541, 541 (1948).

in Id. at 542.

'Id. at 542-43.
"

Id.

120 Id. at 543.

Id.
Id.
123 Id.

121

122

I24 id.
25

1

Id. at 549.

127

354 U.S. 416 (1957).

126 Id. at 549.
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Id. at 417.
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legal separation and alimony.1 30 Mr. Vanderbilt appeared specially in that
proceeding and argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled New York
"to treat the Nevada divorce as having ended the marriage and as having destroyed
any duty of support which he owed . . . ."1 1 The New York court recognized the
Nevada decree as terminating the status of the parties' marriage, but found that it
did not preclude New York from directing Mr. Vanderbilt to pay support, which it

duly ordered. 132
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the fact that Mrs.
Vanderbilt's right to support had not yet been reduced to judgment did not
materially distinguish the case from Estin.13 3 Since Mrs. Vanderbilt had not been
subject to personal jurisdiction in the Nevada court, that court could not terminate
her right to support in an exparte proceeding.13 4
The 1967 "miscegenation" case of Loving v. Virginia also presented a
35
potential interstate marriage recognition issue.s Two Virginia residents, Mildred
Jeter, described as a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, had been
married in Washington, D.C., pursuant to its laws.' 3 6 Shortly after their marriage,
they returned to Virginia where they were indicted, pled guilty to, and were
sentenced to jail for violating the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute. 1 While the
case might have been litigated and decided under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
that issue was not presented to the Court, which found that the statute violated both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 38
III. THE PATCHWORK QUILT OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS
IN THE UNITED STATES

With regard to lawful recognition of same-sex couples, states generally fall
into three main categories: 1) those that permit such couples to enter into marriage
or a quasi-marriage relationship such as civil union or registered partnership; 2)
those that do not permit same-sex couples to enter into legal marriage or marriagetype relationships but recognize such relationships if entered into elsewhere, at
least for some purposes; and 3) those that prohibit and do not recognize same-sex
marriages or quasi-marriage relationships.
At the time of this writing,139 six states permit same-sex couples to marry:
Massachusetts (as of 2004),140 Connecticut (2008),141 Iowa (2009),142 Vermont
130

Id

"' Id
132 Id. at 417-18.
134

Id at 418.
Id at 418-19.

'3 Loving
36

v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 2.
1 Id. at 2-3 N.B. The trial judge suspended the sentence for 25 years on condition
that the Lovings leave Virginia and not return together during that period of time.
138 Id. at 10-12.
19
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(2009), 143 New Hampshire (enacted 2009, effective 2010),144 and New York
(201 1).145 Three additional states have passed laws permitting same-sex marriage,
which had not yet taken effect as of this writing. On February 8, 2012, the
Washington State Legislature enacted a bill to allow same-sex couples to marry,
which Governor Christine Gregoire signed on February 13, 2012.146 Opponents
have stated that they will seek to block implementation through a referendum
measure.14 7 New Jersey's legislature passed a bill allowing same-sex marriage on
February 16, 2012,148 which was quickly vetoed by New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie. 14 9 Soon afterward, Maryland enacted a law permitting same-sex
marriages, which was signed by Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley and will go
into effect (unless blocked) on January 1, 2013."s0
On Dec. 18, 2009, Washington, D.C. Mayor Adrian Fentry signed bill 18-482,
which legalized same-sex marriage in the District of Columbia.15 1 It became
effective March 20 10,152 after Chief Justice John Roberts, acting as circuit justice
for the District, refused to issue a stay. 15 3
California permitted same-sex couples to enter into marriage for
approximately six months in 2008,'"5 during which time it is reported that
In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
14' Kerrigan v. Comm'r Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
142 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
140

143 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009), enacted over gubernatorial veto. See Vermont
Lawmakers Enact Same-Sex MarriageBill, 35 FAM. L. REP. (BNA), no. 21, 2009, at 1251.
4 N.H. House Bill No. 436 (2009).
145 New York Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Laws 95.
146 S.B. 6239, 62 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012); see William Yardley, Washington
State Legislators OK Same-Sex Marriage: Change Could be Stalled by a Referendum, Bos.
GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2012, at 2; Washington: Gay MarriageLegalized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2012, at A17.
147 Yardley, supra note 146.
148 MaryAnn Spoto, N.J Assembly Passes Gay Marriage Bill, NJ.COM
(Feb. 16,
2012, 5:12 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/nj assembly-passesgay
marriag.html.
149 Kate Zernickie, Christie Keeps Promise to Veto Gay MarriageBill, N.Y. TIMES,

(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/christie-vetoes-gaymarriage
-bill.html. Under state law, the New Jersey Assembly has two years, until January 2014, to
override the veto. Id.
150 See Maryland Legislature Enacts Same-Sex Marriage Law, 38

FAM. L.REP.

(BNA), no. 18, 2012, at 1227.
15 Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act, 2009 D.C.
Legis. Serv. 18-110.
152 See Fate of Same-Sex Marriage in D.C. Rests in Hands of Congress, 36 FAM.
L.REP. (BNA), no. 8, 2009, at 1095; Marriage-Homosexuality-Districtof Columbia-Law
Takes Effect, 36 FAM. L. REP. (BNA), no. 18, 2010, at 1215.
153

Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 130 S. Ct. 1279 (2010).

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 65 (Cal. 2009).
154
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approximately 18,000 couples entered these unions.' California voters approved
Proposition 8 in November 2008, banning such marriages. The California Supreme
Court subsequently upheld Proposition 8, but it also ruled that those same-sex
marriages that had been lawfully entered into remained valid.15 6 A federal district
court subsequently struck down California Proposition 8 as unconstitutional.' On
February 7, 2012, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court.' 58 The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by order of June 5,
2012.159
Several other states permit same-sex couples to enter into variously named
forms of legally recognized quasi marriages. In the midst of the Baehr v. Lewin
litigation, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law in 1997 allowing same-sex couples
to become "reciprocal beneficiaries" with many of the "rights and benefits
available only to married couples."'160 Similarly, Vermont created "civil unions"
for same-sex couples in 1999 after its supreme court ruled that denying such
couples the benefits of marriage violated the state constitution.161 Parties to a
Vermont civil union were to have "all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court
rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to
spouses in marriage."' 6 2 When Vermont amended its marriage law to permit samesex couples to marry as of September 1, 2009, it also repealed the procedure for
such couples to enter civil unions, while allowing existing civil unions to continue
and allowing parties in civil unions to marry their civil union partners if they so
choose.16 3 In 2004, New Jersey enacted its "Domestic Partnership Act," permitting
same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register as domestic partners and obtain
some of the rights of married couples.'6 In late 2006, New Jersey enacted a Civil
Union Act, amending the 2004 Domestic Partnership Act.16 5 Under the Civil Union
Act, two eligible individuals of the same sex can enter a civil union and "receive
'5

California high court upholds same-sex marriage ban, CNN (May 27, 2009),

http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/26/california.same.sex.marriage/index.html
Jan. 12, 2012).
156

(last visited

Strauss, 207 P.3d at 48.

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
15 Perry v. Brown, No. 10-16696, 2012 WL 1994574 (9th Cir. June 5, 2012).
16o H.B. 118, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997). Hawaii has since established civil
unions, and, effective Jan. 1, 2012, the provisions of Hawaii state tax law that apply to
married spouses apply to partners in a civil union. See Matthew J. Eickman, Same-Sex
15

158

Marriage: DOMA and the States' Approaches, 36 FAMILY L. REP. (BNA) 1383, 1385
(2010).
161 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); see Vermont Lawmakers Enact Same-Sex
MarriageBill, FAM. L. REP. (BNA), no. 21, 2009, at 1251.
162 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1204(a) (2007).
161 S.B. 115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt.
2009).
'6 2003 N.J. Laws 246.
165 2006 N.J. Laws 103 (enacted in response to Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006)).
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the same benefits and protections and be subject to the same responsibilities as
spouses in a marriage."l 66
The latest state to create a statutory framework for same-sex (and oppositesex) couples to enter into a civil union is Illinois. On January 31, 2011, Illinois
Governor Pat Quinn signed legislation creating civil unions in that state, effective
June 1, 2011.167 The Governor's Office noted that California, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oregon, Washington State, and Washington, D.C. all have civil union or similar

laws on the books.168
Such state quasi-marriage laws have not been consistent as to the means to
dissolve a civil union, domestic partnership, etc., but the trend has been to apply
the same rules that apply to married couples. For example, under Washington
State's 2007 registered domestic partnership law, a member of a registered
domestic partnership could exit that legal status by the simple expedient of filing a
notice of termination and paying a filing fee.169 However, in 2009, the Washington
State legislature amended the law to make those in registered domestic
partnerships subject to the same rules as married people:
It is the intent of the legislature that for all purposes under state law,
state registered domestic partners shall be treated the same as married
spouses. Any privilege, immunity, right, benefit, or responsibility
granted or imposed by statute, administrative or court rule, policy,
common law or any other law to an individual because the individual is
or was a spouse, or because the individual is or was an in-law in a
specified way to another individual, is granted on equivalent terms,
substantive and procedural, to an individual because the individual is or
was in a state registered domestic partnership, or because the individual
is or was, based on a state registered domestic partnership, related in a
specified way to another individual. The provisions of [this act] shall be
liberally construed to achieve equal treatment, to the extent not in
conflict with federal law, of state registered domestic partners and

married spouses. 17 0
Oregon law places the same burden upon a party to a domestic partnership;
that partnership will be treated like a marriage for purposes of dissolution:
An individual who has filed a Declaration of Domestic Partnership may
not file a new Declaration of Domestic Partnership or enter a marriage
with someone other than the individual's registered partner unless a
N.J. REv. STAT. § 37:1-29 (2009); see also N.J. REV. STAT. § 37:1-31 (2009).
Chrisstine Nyholm, Illinois Governor Quinn signs civil union bill, EXAMINER.COM
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/social-justice-in-national/illinois-governor-quinn
-signs-civil-union-bill.
168 Id
169 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 618, WASH. REV. CODE § 26-60-055
(repealed 2009).
170 WASH. REV. CODE § 26-60-015
(2012).
166
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judgment of dissolution or annulment of the most recent domestic
partnership has been entered. This prohibition does not apply if the
previous domestic partnership ended because one of the partners died.' 7 '
New Jersey follows the same pattern with its civil unions:
The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedures and be
subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved
in the dissolution of marriage.172
The point is that most states that permit same-sex couples to enter legally
recognized, quasi-marital relationships, will normally require a disillusioned
member of that couple to obtain a divorce in order to become legally free, just as if
she were in a state that permits same-sex marriage by name.
There is another, smaller group of states that will not allow same-sex couples
to marry or enter into quasi-marital relationships, but will recognize same-sex
marriages validly entered into elsewhere, at least for certain purposes. New York
State was a notable example before it authorized same-sex marriage in 2011.173
Similarly in May 2009, prior to allowing same-sex marriages to be performed
there, the Washington D.C. Council had voted to recognize same-sex marriages
from other jurisdictions.' 74 In February 2010, the Attorney General of Maryland
issued a formal opinion that Maryland may recognize such marriages. 7 1 In May
2010, the Maryland Department of Budget and Management announced that it was
extending health benefits to the same-sex spouses of active and retired state
employees who were validly married in another state.17 6 In January 2011, the
Attorney General of New Mexico issued a formal opinion, not binding on New
Mexico courts, that "a same-sex marriage that is valid under the laws of the

17nOR. REV. STAT. § 106.325(3) (2009).
172 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (West 2011),

available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/

2006/Bills/PLO6/103 -.HTM.
'73 See Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328 (N.Y. 2009); C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d
884 (2008) (holding that principles of comity permitted New York to recgnize, and thus
exercise jurisdiction over, a couple's same-sex marriage in Massachusetts). Thus, a New
York trial court was able in 2010 to grant a divorce to a same-sex couple who had entered
into a civil union in Vermont without addressing the difficult issues that a state law
prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages would have presented. Parker v. Waronker,
918 N.Y.S.2d 822, 822 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 2010).

174

See Tim Craig, Uproarin D.C. as Same-Sex MarriageGains,WASH. POST, May 6,

2009, at Al, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2 00 9/05/
05/AR2009050501618.html.
7 Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That is Valid in the State of Celebration
May be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (2010).

176 Maryland Offers Health Benefits to Workers in Same-Sex Marriagesfrom Other
States, 36 FAMILY LAW REP. (BNA) 1335, 1335 (2010).
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country or state where it was consummated would likewise be found valid in New
Mexico."' 7 7
The largest group of states are those that not only do not allow same-sex
marriage (or quasi marriage), but also explicitly provide by a state statute or
constitutional provision that they will not recognize a same-sex marriage validly
entered into elsewhere. Following the federal DOMA, many of these state
provisions are known as "mini-DOMAs" or "state DOMAs." A survey published
in the BNA Family Law Reporter in June 2010 concluded:

As of June 2, 2010, 45 states prohibit same-sex marriage. Ten do so
through statute only, four through state constitution amendments only,
27 through both statute and state constitution amendments, two through
case law (New York and New Jersey), and two through the state attorney
general's office (New Mexico and Rhode Island). Depending on one's
statutory construction, approximately 40 of those expressly refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages of other jurisdictions, and some of those
more broadly refer to other same-sex relatiohships." 8
Pennsylvania enacted a typical mini-DOMA in 1996, containing two new
statutory provisions. The first defines marriage as "[a] civil contract by which one
man and one woman take each other for husband and wife." 7 9 The second
addresses interstate recognition:
It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public policy of
this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one
woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered
into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered
into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.180
IV. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: SEEKING A LEGAL EXIT FROM A
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN A STATE THAT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THAT MARRIAGE

Americans are a famously restless people. Two centuries ago, Alexis de
Tocqueville observed that, "[i]n the United States a man builds a house in which to
spend his old age, and he sells it before the roof is on; .

.

. he settles in a place,

which he soon afterwards leaves to carry his changeable longings elsewhere." 81
Those words are even truer in today's world of high-speed transportation and the
Internet than when they were written in the 1830s.
"'111-01 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (2011).
178 Matthew J. Eickman, Same-Sex Marriage:DOMA and the States'Approaches,
36

L. REP. (BNA) 1383, 1385 (2010).
23 PA. CONs. STAT. § 1102 (2012).
"80 Id. § 1704.
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Moreover, the break up of a serious relationship often triggers, or is triggered
by, a move of one or both of the parties to that relationship. A party may leave and
put distance between herself and her spouse or partner to escape abuse, to take a
new job, to be near or live with family members or friends who can provide a
support system (especially when she has minor children), to follow or join a new
significant other, or simply to get a "fresh start." Normally the physical departure
from the relationship and the situs of the relationship precedes any serious thought
about legally ending the relationship. Indeed, physical separation is often deemed
by one or both of the parties to be part of a "trial separation."
Additionally, for a variety of reasons, couples often get married in a
jurisdiction where they do not reside. They may marry where one or both have
family. They may choose to have a "destination wedding" in some romantic or
vacation location. As was the case in May 's Estate, they may temporarily leave a
jurisdiction where they cannot marry, travel to a jurisdiction where they can and do
marry, and then return home.
For all these reasons, it is not surprising that an individual may well reside in
a different jurisdiction from the one in which she married at the time that she
decides to initiate divorce proceedings. If she has left a same-sex marriage (or
quasi marriage) and is domiciled in a jurisdiction that refuses to recognize that
marriage, she is likely to find herself in a form of legal limbo. A recent
Pennsylvania case, Kern v. Taney,' 82 illustrates her dilemma.
Two women, Carole Kern and Robin Taney, were married in
Massachusetts.183 Subsequently, Carole moved to Pennsylvania and filed for a
divorce, utilizing the Pennsylvania no-fault divorce ground of irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage.1 84 Robin did not appear to defend the action. 85
However, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania intervened in order to defend the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's mini-DOMA. 186
The trial judge reasoned that, "relief under the Divorce Code can only be
obtained by parties who are recognized to be married."' 87 Under the second section
of Pennsylvania's mini-DOMA, Section 1704 of the Domestic Relations Code,
quoted above, the parties could not be recognized as married.'" Therefore, Carole
attacked the constitutionality of the act, asserting that it violated her substantive
due process and equal protection rights to marry under both the Pennsylvania and
United States Constitutions.' 8 9
The trial court dismissed all of Carole's constitutional challenges, finding that
homosexuals have no fundamental right to be married to each other.190 The court
182

'

84

8

Pa. D. & C.5th 558 (2010).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 559-60.
See id.

186id.

'Id. at 562.
'Ild. at 562-63.
89 Id. at 564.
' 90 Id. at 574.
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applied the "rational basis" test.'9 1 In arguably a circular piece of reasoning, the
court concluded, "The amendment did not expand, limit, alter or otherwise change
the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As such, the legislation did not
impose an inequality on homosexuals."' 92 Accordingly, the court could not grant
her a divorce. 193 The court did, however, offer Carole an alternative legal solution:
Plaintiff has a concern that she has no available remedy in Pennsylvania,
and since she does not qualify under the residency requirements of
Massachusetts, she is unable to obtain a divorce. While it is true that
Pennsylvania cannot grant her a divorce, there is no reason why she
cannot seek relief under section 1704, requesting the court to have her
marriage declared void. 19 4
However, a declaration in Pennsylvania that Carole and Robin's
Massachusetts marriage was void as against Pennsylvania public policy would
hardly be the equivalent of a Pennsylvania divorce decree. Under Williams 1, a
divorce decree should be entitled to full faith and credit in all states.195 It is
difficult to believe that a decree of annulment based on Pennsylvania's public
policy against same-sex marriage would be accorded full faith and credit in those
states that permit such marriages, especially Massachusetts. So, with a
Pennsylvania annulment, Carole might well find herself in the "unhappy"
circumstance that befell O.B. and Lillie in the Williams litigation. She would be
married in one state and not in another. As was the case with O.B. and Lillie, it
would remain questionable whether she could legally remarry. If, after obtaining
an annulment in Pennsylvania, she were to marry a man in Pennsylvania, could
they honeymoon on "Old Cape Cod" per Patti Page's old chartbuster? If they did,
could not Massachusetts arrest, try and punish her for bigamy under Massachusetts
law,1 9 6 just as happened to O.B. and Lillie seven decades ago in North Carolina?
Indeed, could not that fate befall her if she were to go to any of the states that
either permit or recognize same-sex marriage?
Presumably the only effective remedy theoretically available to Carole would
be to file for divorce in Massachusetts. But, in Massachusetts, as elsewhere in the
United States, it is significantly more time-consuming to get divorced than to get
married. As noted by the trial court, there is no residency requirement to be
married in Massachusetts, but to get a divorce generally the parties have to have
resided in Massachusetts together for a year preceding the commencement of the
action. 197 Since Carole had to have resided in Pennsylvania for six months before

191

Id

192

Id. at 575.
19 Id. at 576.
194 id
195 See supra text accompanying notes 93-105.
196 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 15 (2012).
'97 Kern, Pa. D. & C.5th at 560 n.2 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208,

§§ 4-5).
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she would have to move to
filing her Pennsylvania divorce action,
Massachusetts-and presumably find housing and employment-for a year just to
commence a divorce action there.19 9
The result in Kern v. Taney is consistent with that reached in other miniDOMA jurisdictions in similar situations (with three recent notable exceptions that
will be discussed infra 200). Thus, in 2007, in Chambers v. Ormiston,201 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court was presented with this certified question:
May the Family Court properly recognize, for the purpose of
entertaining a divorce petition, the marriage of two persons of the
same sex who were purportedly married in another state? 202
In Chambers, two Rhode Island women, Margaret Chambers and Cassandra
Ormiston, had married each other in Massachusetts in 2004, and then returned to
reside together in Rhode Island.20 3 In October 2006, Ms. Chambers filed for
divorce in Rhode Island.204 The Family Court was concerned that it lacked
jurisdiction and asked for guidance from the state's highest court as to whether the
parties were married under Rhode Island law.205 The Rhode Island courts assumed
that the parties' marriage was valid under Massachusetts law.206 But, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court ruled that "marriage" under its state statute is "the state of
being united to a person of the opposite sex."207 Since the parties, therefore, were
not married under Rhode Island law, the Rhode Island courts lacked jurisdiction to
entertain a divorce action.208
Like the Pennsylvania trial court in Kern, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
expressed some sympathy for the thwarted plaintiff:
We know that sometimes our decisions result in palpable hardship
to the persons affected by them. It is, however, a fundamental principle
of jurisprudence that a court has no power to grant relief in the absence
of jurisdiction, as is true in the instant case. Ours is not a policy-making
branch of the government. We are cognizant of the fact that this
observation may be cold comfort to the parties before us. But, if there is

23 PA. CONs. STAT.

§ 3104(b) (2012).
199 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a one-year residency
198

requirement to commence a divorce action in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975).
200 See infra text accompanying notes 228-245.
201 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
202
Id. at 958.
203 Id.
204
Id. at 958-59.
205 Id. at 959.
2 06
Id. at 958-59.
207 Id. at 962.
208

1d.

at 967.
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to be a remedy to this predicament, fashioning such a remedy would fall
within the province of the General Assembly. 209
In 2008, in O'Darling v. O'Darling,2 10 the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled
that a trial court judge had properly vacated a divorce decree of a couple that had
been married in Canada, where the trial judge learned after entering the decree
that both parties were women. 2 11 The state supreme court admonished counsel for
the plaintiff for having failed to disclose the fact that the marriage was between
two women, hence invalid under Oklahoma law. 2 12
In 2010, a Texas court of appeals likewise ordered dismissal of a divorce
action filed between two men who had been married in Massachusetts in In the
Matter of the Marriageof J.B. and H.B.2 13 In J.B. and HB., the trial court had
granted the divorce, ruling that the state's constitutional and statutory provisions
barring recognition of same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 14 On appeal by the
state, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and ordered dismissal of the divorce
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 15 The Texas Constitution had been
amended in 2005 to provide:
(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and
one woman.
(b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or
recognize any legal status identical or *similar to marriage. 216
Further, the Texas Family Code had been amended to provide in
Section 6.204:
(b) A marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union is
contrary to the public policy of this state and is void in this state.
(c) The state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not
give effect to a:
(1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates,
recognizes, or validates a marriage between persons of the
same sex or a civil union in this state or in any other
jurisdiction; or
209 Id. at
210

966-67.
188 P.3d 137 (Okla. 2008).

211 Id. at 138.

140.

212

Id. at 139. The state supreme court remanded the case for procedural reasons. Id at

213

326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2010).
Id. at 659.

214

215 Id. at 681.
216

Id. at 663 (citing TEX. CONST. art I, § 32).
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(2) right or claim to any legal protection, benefit, or
responsibility asserted as a result of a marriage between
persons of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in any
other jurisdiction. 2 17
The appellate court readily concluded that these constitutional and statutory
provisions barred the same-sex divorce action.218 Thus the court was compelled to
address whether these provisions violated the United States Constitution.2 19
Applying the rational basis test, the court concluded: "Texas's marriage laws are
rationally related to the goal of promoting the raising of children in households
headed by opposite-sex couples." 220
Finally, the appellate court noted that the plaintiff could file a "voidance
action" seeking to have his marriage annulled, even though he would not have all
the ancillary remedies available in that action that he would have had in a divorce
action, such as spousal maintenance and community property rights. 2 2 ' The court
quite unconvincingly disagreed with his contention that such a declaration of
voidance might not be recognized in other jurisdictions.222 But the court failed to
provide any cogent reason why Massachusetts, for example, would give full faith
and credit to a declaration that a Massachusetts same-sex marriage is void as
against public policy.223
In a similar case, Rosengarten v. Downes,2 24 decided by the Appellate Court
of Connecticut six years before Connecticut authorized same-sex marriage, the
court ruled that Connecticut courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain an action by one
of its residents to dissolve a same-sex civil union he had entered in Vermont. 2 2 5
The court reasoned that, "[i]f Connecticut does not recognize the validity of such a
union, then there is no res to address and dissolve."226
217

2 18

Id.

1 d. at

669-70.
670.
677.
678-79.
679.
223 There is one Texas trial court case in which the court granted a divorce by
agreement to two women who had been married in Massachusetts. The state tried to
219 Id. at
220 Id. at
221 Id. at
222 Id. at

intervene unsuccessfully. The state appealed, but the Court of Appeals, Austin, ruled that
the state lacked standing and dismissed the appeal. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex.
App. 2011), petitionfor review filed Mar. 21, 2011. Thus, while the divorce decree remains
valid, the appellate decision cannot be construed as an affirmance on the merits, nor is it
inconsistent with In the Matter of the MarriageofJ.B. and H.B.
224 802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002).
225 Id. at 172,
184.
226 Id. at 175. The refusal of most American states to recognize valid same-sex
marriages from other jurisdictions does not always disadvantage one or both parties to such
a marriage. In the anomalous case of In re Marriageof Bureta, a former husband sought to
end his pension payments to his ex-wife on the grounds that she had remarried. 164 P.3d
534, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). She had traveled to Oregon with her female partner,
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It was not until June 2011 that a state appellate court in a mini-DOMA
jurisdiction found a way to grant relief to an individual seeking legal escape from a
foreign 22 same-sex marriage. In Christiansen v. Christiansen,228 two women,
Paula and Victoria, had been legally married in Canada in 2008.229 Paula filed an
apparently uncontested divorce action against Victoria in Wyoming in 2010.230 The
district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the
now familiar reasoning that since the forum state does not recognize same-sex
marriage, the state's divorce law did not apply.231 In a brief and unanimous
opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the

case.232
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressly limited its analysis to recognition of
a foreign same-sex marriage for the sole purpose of granting a divorce. "The
question of recognition of such same-sex marriages for any other reason, being not
properly before us, is left for another day." 23 3
The Court viewed the matter as one of statutory construction, attempting to
resolve statutory provisions in apparent conflict with each other. Wyoming Statute
Annotated §20-1-111 provides, "all marriage contracts which are valid by the laws
of the country in which contracted are valid in this state." 2 34 But, Wyoming's miniDOMA defines a marriage as "a civil contract between a male and a female person
. . . ."235 Significantly, however, Wyoming's mini-DOMA "does not speak to
recognition of a same-sex marriage validly entered into [elsewhere]."2 36
The Court acknowledged long-standing case law that there are exceptions to
Wyoming's recognition of validly entered-into foreign marriages: "namely,
marriages which are deemed contrary to the law of nature as generally recognized
in Christian countries, such as polygamous and incestuous marriages, and those
which the legislature of the state has declared shall not be allowed any validity,
because contrary to the policy of its laws."2 37

obtained a marriage license, and participated in a marriage ceremony. Id. at 535. But, later,
the Oregon Supreme Court declared such marriage to be invalid. Id. Thus, the Washington
courts concluded that the ex-wife had never remarried-despite the ceremony-and the exhusband was not entitled to an order terminating the payments to her. Id. at 536.
227 1 use "foreign" in the sense of extra-territorial. This could mean another state,
although in this case the parties were married in a foreign country.
228 253 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2011).
229

230

Id. at 154.

Id. Victoria did not file a brief in the subsequent appeal. Id.
154-55.
232 Id. at 157.
233 Id. at 154 n.1.
234Id. at 155 (quoting WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-111 (2009)).
235
Id. at 154 (quoting WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101).
236 Id. at 156. (discussing WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101).
237
Id. (citing Hoagland v. Hoagland, 193 P. 843, 843-44 (Wyo. 1920)).
231 Id. at
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However, the exceptions are meant to be narrow, lest they "swallow the
rule." 2 38 Thus, for example, although Wyoming will not permit a common law
marriage to be created within the state, it will consider valid a common law
marriage legally entered into in another state.239 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that "recognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose of
entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy in Wyoming
against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages."240
The Court noted that all that was being sought was a divorce, that the parties
were "not seeking to live in Wyoming as a married couple . . ." and, importantly,

that they "are not seeking to enforce any right incident to the status of being
married." 24'
In July 2011, between the date that the New York legislature enacted its
Marriage Equality Act and that Act's effective date, an appellate court in New
242
York reached a similar conclusion in Dickerson v. Thompson.
Two women,
Audrey and Sonya, had entered into a civil union in Vermont. Unable to meet
Vermont's residency requirements for a dissolution action, Audrey brought an
action in New York to dissolve the civil union, and Sonya did not defend that
action. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and the appellate court reversed and remanded.243 On remand, the trial court
entered "a declaration relieving the parties from all rights and obligations arising
from the civil union, but denied that portion of the motion seeking a dissolution of
the union." 244 The appellate division again reversed. "We disagree with the [trial
court's] conclusion that, in the absence of any legislatively created mechanism in
New York by which a court could grant the dissolution of a civil union entered into
in another state, it was powerless to grant the requested relief."24 5
Most recently, in May 2012, the Maryland Court of Appeals reached a similar
conclusion in Port v. Cowan.24 6 Two women, Jessica and Virginia, had been
legally married in California in 2008 when such marriages could be legally
performed there. They separated two years later by mutual agreement.
Subsequently Jessica filed for divorce in Maryland on the ground of voluntary
separation, and Virginia answered the complaint in a "no contest" manner. The
couple had no children, and neither raised a financial claim against the other.
Nevertheless the trial court denied the divorce on the ground that the marriage was
not valid under Maryland law. 24 7

238

id

239

Id.

240

id
id
928 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).

241

242

243 Id. at 97.

244 Id. at
245 id.
246
247

99, 123.

No. 69, 2012 WL 1758629 (Md. Ct. App. May 18, 2012).
Id at * 1.
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The Maryland Court of Appeals unanimously reversed. 2 4 8 Although at the
time of this case Maryland Family Law provided that "only a marriage between a
man and a woman is valid in this State,"249 it did not specifically address the
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages legally performed in another
jurisdiction. The Court found that "for purposes of the application of its domestic
divorce laws," the doctrine of comity compels recognition of the marriage, and that
such recognition is not repugnant to Maryland public policy. 2 50
Unfortunately, the Christiansen,Dickerson and Port decisions will be of little
or no value to unhappy spouses locked in same-sex marriages in most of the
United States. The approach of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Christiansen,
whatever its merits under Wyoming law, cannot be utilized in the vast majority of
mini-DOMA states. That court was not confronted with a state statute explicitly
barring recognition of a foreign same-sex marriage, nor was the Dickerson court
confronted with such a statute in New York.2 5 1 Indeed, the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Port noted that whereas other states, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia,
have enacted specific statutory provisions preventing recognition of foreign samesex marriages, Maryland's statute is silent on the subject. 252 But, as noted above,
approximately forty of forty-five mini-DOMA states do have statutory or
constitutional provisions explicitly barring such recognition. 25 3
V. THREADING THE NEEDLE: A PATH FORWARD

Legal scholars who have examined this issue have proposed various ingenious
solutions to address it, none of which, as the cases cited above show, have
commanded judicial respect.
Professor Barbara J. Cox, herself in a same-sex marriage entered into in
Ontario, Canada, has argued that courts in mini-DOMA states:
should consider whether an 'incidents of marriage' approach to the
issue in the case may lead them to recognize the civil union, domestic
partnership, or marriage based on the policy reasons behind that
disputed issue. They should work as hard to honor the relationships of
same-sex couples as they have worked to honor the relationships of

opposite-sex couples. 2 54

Id.
Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2009)).
250
Id. at *6.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 234-237,
245.
252 No. 69, 2012 WL 1758629 at *5 (Md. Ct. App. May 18, 2012).
253 See supra text accompanying
note 178.
248

249

Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When Considering
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships,13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 757 (2004).
254
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Under this approach a court could address the benefits, rights, and responsibilities
flowing to a couple, without necessarily recognizing the marriage itself.2 55 There
are two major problems with this approach. First, unless those benefits, rights or
responsibilities flow out of a valid antenuptial agreement, they don't exist absent a
valid marriage. Second, a finding of a valid marriage will be not only contrary to
the state's mini-DOMA, but also be politically untenable in a state that has enacted
such a statute or constitutional amendment. Indeed, the very plea that courts in
such states should work "hard to honor the relationships of same-sex couples" is
doomed to failure (absent, of course, repeal of the state mini-DOMA).2 5 6
Professor Linda Silberman has taken a more cautious approach.257 She has
proposed "balanced choice-of-law rules," along the line of the old "marriage
evasion" laws whereby the problem is avoided by having:
states . . . limit the application of their same-sex marriage or civil union
laws to members of their own community-either through a residency
requirement or by restricting application of the law to persons who do
not face an impediment to such a marriage under the laws of the
jurisdictions where they reside or intend to reside.258
There are two main problems with this approach. First, it provides no avenue of
legal redress to the person who entered a same-sex marriage while residing or
intending to reside in a same-sex marriage jurisdiction, who later-for any of
myriad reasons-relocates to a mini-DOMA state. Second, as a practical matter,
the genie is already out of the bottle. The first same-sex marriage state,
Massachusetts, repealed its "marriage evasion" act in 2008, after its courts used
that act to bar same-sex couples from mini-DOMA states from getting married in
Massachusetts.2 59 Proponents of repeal explicitly noted that Massachusetts had an
economic interest in becoming a same-sex marriage destination:
State officials said they expected a multimillion-dollar benefit in
weddings and tourism, especially from people who live in New York. A
just-released study commissioned by the State of Massachusetts
concludes that in the next three years about 32,200 couples would travel
here to get married, creating 330 permanent jobs and adding $111
million to the economy, not including spending by wedding guests and
tourist activities the weddings might generate.

2 55

1 d. at 718-19.

Id.
Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage:Refining the Conflict ofLaws Analysis, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 2195 (2005).
256

257

5
1 1Id. at
259 2008

notes 76-80.

2204, 2213.
Mass. Acts 216 (repeal effective Aug. 1, 2008); see supra text accompanying
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"We now have this added pressure, given what's happened in California,
that we really think that it is a good thing that we be prepared to receive
the economic benefit," State Senator Dianne Wilkerson, a Democrat who
sponsored the repeal bill, said Tuesday after the vote.260
Several law student notes and comments have struggled heroically to resolve
the issue of same-sex divorce in mini-DOMA jurisdictions. Writing in the
Hastings Law Journal in 2003, Jessica A. Hoogs proposed that states create a
"uniform dissolution proceeding," presumably through legislative enactment. 26'
Given the failure of the states to generally adopt the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act262 and the political divide over same-sex unions, this clever idea
appears to be infeasible.
Writing in the Marquette Law Review in 2009, Louis Thorson suggested three

methods that Wisconsin courts could use in same-sex divorce cases: 1) bar access
to the courts for relief, 2) apply Wisconsin divorce law, or 3) have Wisconsin

courts apply the laws of the state where the relationship was founded.263 He
acknowledged that while all three approaches have their justifications, they also
have their own difficulties.264 He admitted that the second approach, applying
Wisconsin divorce law, "likely would violate both the Wisconsin Statutes and the
Wisconsin Constitution." 26 5
Writing in the Boston University Law Review, also in 2009, John M. Yarwood

argued that mini-DOMA states should create property distribution mechanisms for
same-sex couples seeking to terminate an out-of-state same-sex marriage.266 While
this might be a "consummation devoutly to be wished,"2 67 unfortunately it
probably falls within the category of wishful thinking, given current political
realities.
Writing in the Santa Clara Law Review in 2010, Danielle Johnson proposed,
"courts should use an incidental approach to marriage recognition when

260

Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima, A 1913 Law Dies to Better Serve Gay Marriages,

N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/16/us/16gay.html?_4=1&
pagewanted=print.
261 Jessica A. Hoogs, Divorce Without Marriage:Establishinga Uniform Dissolution
Procedure for Domestic Partners Through a Comparative Analysis of European and
American Domestic PartnersLaws, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 708 (2003).
262 See supra note 5.
263 Louis Thorson, Same-Sex Divorce and Wisconsin Courts:
Imperfect Harmony?, 92
MARQ. L. REv. 617, 618-19 (2009).
264 Id. at 619.
265 Id. at
642.
266 John M. Yarwood, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Mini-DOMA
States, Migratory
Same-Sex Marriage, Divorce, and a PracticalSolution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L.
REv. 1355, 1388 (2009).

267 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK

Wright eds., 2d ed. 1874).
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considering a divorce petition in order to avoid unreasonably burdensome, illogical
results."268 She argued cogently that:
When the law of the forum state conflicts with, or is silent on, the
legality of the underlying marriage, the court can use an incidental
approach to marriage recognition and consider the divorce as an incident
of that marriage. By recognizing the marriage for the limited purpose of
the divorce, the court can confine its consideration of the relationship so
as to avoid addressing the validity of the underlying marriage. The
ability to legally end a marriage validly performed in another state is an
incident of that marriage that should be available uniformly across the
states, regardless of whether that state disagrees with the underlying
marriage. Parties seeking an uncontested dissolution of their union are
not asking the court to validate the union; they are simply asking the
court to dissolve it. By refusing to perform a divorce in a same-sex
couple's home state, some states have made it incredibly burdensome for
that couple to legally end their relationship.269
She concluded:
Using the incidental approach, the court can view divorce as an incident
of marriage, analyze the policies behind the incident at issue, and then
decide whether the marriage should be recognized for the sole purpose
of performing the divorce.270
While this approach has the merit of being practical and is similar to what I will
suggest, it has one fatal flaw: It would require a court in a mini-DOMA state to do
something it is prohibited from doing: recognize a same-sex marriage.
Any effort to bridge the enormous divide between those states that permit
same-sex marriage and those that consider it an anathema is obviously fraught with
peril. Bearing in mind Justice Holmes' aphorism that, "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience," 2 7' surely an incremental approach which
respects the position of anti-same-sex marriage jurisdictions while providing relief
to their unhappily wed citizens is the most likely of success.
The author's proposal for same-sex divorce is minimalist: Where a party to a
same-sex marriage seeks a simple, uncontested, no-fault divorce in a mini-DOMA
jurisdiction, the court can and should grant the divorce without inquiring into or
addressingthe validity of the marriage.

268

Danielle Johnson, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction:A CriticalAnalysis of Chambers

v. Ormiston and Why Divorce Is an Incident of Marriage that Should Be Uniformly
Recognized Throughout the States, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 225, 227 (2010).
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 253-54.
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It must be acknowledged that this proposal will not aid the happily married
(or quasi-married) same-sex couple now residing in a mini-DOMA jurisdiction.
Under current law, they have no benefits flowing out of their marital relationship
other than those that might be secured by contract. This proposal will not
circumvent the incidents of marriage rules articulated by the Court in Estin,
Vanderbilt, and their progeny. Even a court that might be persuaded to grant a
divorce would probably be barred from addressing financial issues that it would
normally resolve in the dissolution of an opposite-sex marriage. The proposal
would also provide no relief, for example, to a member of a same-sex couple
whose spouse is negligently killed in a mini-DOMA state, who wishes to bring a
wrongful death claim.272
The proposed solution has several important benefits. First, it is completely
consistent with dominant legal practice in the United States today. Since the advent
of no-fault divorce in California in 1970,273 all states have made efforts to simplify
the divorce process and make it less adversarial.274 Based on the author's three
decades of family law practice, it would be truly extraordinary for a court to spend
its time in an uncontested no-fault divorce questioning the validity of the marriage.
Second, and in the same vein, judicial resources are scarce and judicial time
precious. How does it benefit the court or the parties to waste limited judicial
resources inquiring into the validity of a marriage when the only action before the
court is an uncontested one to terminate the marriage?
Third, as noted, courts in some of the cited cases have recognized the hardship
imposed on their own residents by refusing to grant a divorce in this situation.275
Hence, one may be able to appeal to the judge's sense of equity in seeking such a
result.
Fourth, this proposal is neither fanciful nor radical. The author has served as
codirector of his law school's Family Law Clinic for almost three decades. During
this time, the clinic has filed divorce complaints where it was far from clear that
the client was legally married. For example, in one case, the client and her husband
had separated years before, and she had no way to contact him. 27 6 She recalled
receiving some papers from a lawyer long ago about a divorce but had long since
lost them and didn't even'know what state they were from. She asked the clinic if
she were already divorced, and, of course, no one could tell her.277 The only
practical option to clarify her legal situation was to file a divorce and serve her
See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the person who had married a male decedent could not maintain a wrongful
death action as a surviving spouse because she was a male-to-female transsexual and hence
in a non-recognized same-sex marriage).
272

273 See Robert E. Rains & Gianluca Benedetti, A Discursive Essay on the Nature of
Marriageand Divorce in Italy and the United States, 10 DIG. 1, 22-23 (2002).
274 See
id.
275 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 241.

Since this case did not result in a reported decision, the client's name is not cited
here for privacy reasons.
277 There is no national register of divorces in the United
States.
276
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husband by publication. He did not enter an appearance, and the court granted her
a no-fault divorce without further ado. lii another case, where the parties had had a
marriage ceremony in another state but it appeared that they had failed to obtain a
marriage license, the clinic filed a divorce for the wife, and the husband appeared
and defended on the grounds that there was no valid marriage. Once the defendant
spouse raised the issue, the court quite properly held a hearing on the subject (and
ruled that there was a valid marriage).2 78 The point is that it is perfectly
appropriate-and commonplace-to file a divorce even where a party's marital
status might be questioned, and a court will not ordinarily waste its time
conducting an inquiry into marital status when a simple, no-fault divorce is
uncontested.279
Fifth, while a purist might question the logic of granting a divorce from a void
marriage, there is nothing that inherently prevents a court from granting a divorce
where an annulment might also be available. Pennsylvania statutory law contains
an explicit example. Section 3304(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Domestic Relations
Code, "[g]rounds for annulment of void marriages," provides:
(a) General rule-Where there has been no confirmation by
cohabitation following the removal of an impediment, the supposed or
alleged marriage of a person shall be deemed void in the following
cases:
(1) Where either party at the time of such marriage had an
existing spouse and the former marriage had not been annulled
nor had there been a divorce except where that party had
obtained a decree of presumed death of the former spouse.280
Thus, a woman (or man) who discovers, as one of the clinic's clients did, that her
spouse was married all along to someone else, may seek and obtain an annulment
of her void marriage. But, she also has a second legal option: divorce. Section
3301 (a)(4) of the Domestic Relations Code, "[g]rounds for divorce," provides:

Jagdeo v. Dookharan, 58 Cumb. 195 (2009).
This approach is also completely consistent with the only appellate case in
Pennsylvania addressing same-sex marriage, De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984). In De Santo, one man sued another man in divorce claiming that they had
entered into a common law marriage. Id. at 952. The defendant filed an answer denying
that the defendant and the plaintiff were ever married or were capable of being married. Id.
Since the defendant put the existence of the marriage at issue, it was entirely appropriate
for the trial court to address that matter, and it did so, finding that there was no valid
marriage. Id. That finding was affirmed on appeal, with the superior court ruling as a
matter of law that two persons of the same sex could not contract a common law marriage
in Pennsylvania. Id.
280 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(a)(1) (1990).
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(a) Fault-The court may grant a divorce to the innocent and injured
spouse whenever it is judged that the other spouse has: ...
(4) Knowingly entered into a bigamous marriage while a
former marriage is still subsisting.2 8 1
The fact that such a marriage is void and subject to annulment does not
prevent a court from granting a divorce.
Finally, it can be readily and honestly argued that this approach is fully
consistent with the mini-DOMA states' anti-same-sex marriage position. The cases
where courts have denied a divorce have had the counter-productive result of
preserving a same-sex marriage rather than terminating it. By refusing to grant the
divorce, the court is assuring that its resident remains in the very same-sex
marriage that is antithetical to the state's public policy. For reasons stated above,
even an annulment in the mini-DOMA state is unlikely to free its resident from her
same-sex marriage in states that recognize such marriages. On the other hand, a
divorce granted in compliance with the dictates of Williams I would be entitled to
full faith and credit in all states.
Indeed, in striking down a mandatory filing fee for poor people seeking
divorces, the Supreme Court recognized the inextricable connection between the
right to divorce and the right to marry:
Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage
relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this
relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely
because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages.282
The short-term result of a universally recognized divorce is one fewer samesex marriage. For the plaintiff spouse, the long-term result may be either: 1)
remaining single, or 2) entering an opposite-sex marriage, or 3) entering another
same-sex marriage. The first two long-term outcomes carry forward the state's
anti-same-sex marriage position. The third outcome is actually neutral: the
individual is still in a same-sex marriage, albeit a new one, and the sum total of
same-sex marriages is not affected.283 The second outcome is not at all fanciful.
Individuals have been known to leave same-sex relationships and, then or later,
form opposite sex relationships. 284 It would be the height of irony for a court's
Id. at § 3301(a)(4).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
283 Of course, it is possible that the other party to the initial same-sex marriage
might
same-sex
an
additional
which
would
create
of
the
same
sex,
also remarry another person
marriage.
284 See, for example, L.S.K. v. H.A.N., a Pennsylvania child support case between two
formerly lesbian partners, in which the court noted that both women are now married. 813
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refusal to grant an uncontested divorce to someone in a same-sex marriage to result
in that person's not being truly legally free to enter into an opposite-sex marriage,
the very institution the mini-DOMA states are supposedly trying to preserve and
support.

A.2d 872, 875 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). Similarly, in the long-running interstate custody
battles between former Vermont civil union partners, Lisa Miller and Janet Miller-Jenkins,
see Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 12 A.3d 768 (Vt. 2010), Lisa Miller has purportedly
"renounced her homosexuality," rediscovered her Baptist faith, and "is often flanked by
others who've renounced their homosexuality and joined the faith." See Lorraine Ali, Mrs.
Kramer vs. Mrs. Kramer, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/
12/05/mrs-kramer-vs-mrs-kramer.print.html.

